This vote proposes to ratify the ENS DAO Constitution with SHA1 hash e8be5fdbe1b0267c283a397f2a7128206689398c, reproduced below for convenience.
If, at the end of the voting period, all articles have at least two-thirds approval, the Constitution as a whole will be considered passed, effective immediately.
If at least one article has less than two-thirds approval at the end of the voting period, only the articles with at least two-thirds approval will be considered passed, and amendment and ratification of the remaining articles, and any new articles, becomes the responsibility of ENS DAO delegates. In such a situation, the modified Constitution may be ratified by an article-by-article approval vote by delegates with a period of at least one week.
ENS DAO Constitution
The ENS constitution is a set of binding rules that determine what governance actions are legitimate for the DAO to take.
Each article has examples of permissible and non permissible actions. These examples are illustrative and should not be considered a binding part of the text of the constitution itself.
I. Name ownership shall not be infringed
ENS governance will not enact any change that infringes on the rights of ENS users to retain names they own, or unfairly discriminate against name owners’ ability to extend, transfer, or otherwise use their names.
Examples
Permissible: ENS governance may enact a change affecting the registration or extension costs of all names based on transparent criteria such as length, as long as it pursues a goal outlined in this constitution.
Not Permissible: ENS governance must not enact a change increasing or reducing the extension costs of a list of existing ENS names, as this would unfairly benefit or penalise a handpicked group.
II. Fees are primarily an incentive mechanism
The primary purpose of registration fees is as an incentive mechanism to prevent the namespace becoming overwhelmed with speculatively registered names. A secondary purpose is to provide enough revenue to the DAO to fund ongoing development and improvement of ENS. ENS governance will not enact any fee other than for these purposes.
Examples
Permissible: ENS governance may increase the price of name registrations in order to address excessive speculative registrations induced by a price that is set too low, or because the current price is insufficient to fund ongoing ENS operations at a reasonable level.
Not Permissible: ENS governance must not enact a change imposing a fee for claiming DNS domains inside ENS, because such a fee would be purely an income generating measure and not an incentive mechanism.
III. Income funds ENS and other public goods
Any income generated to the ENS treasury is to be used first of all to ensure the long-term viability of ENS, and to fund continuing development and improvement of the ENS system. Funds that are not reasonably required to achieve this goal may be used to fund other public goods within web3 as ENS governance sees fit.
ENS governance will not allocate funds to a team or individual who does not commit to uphold the same principles outlined in this constitution in their use of the allocated funds.
Examples
Permissible: ENS governance may offer grant funding for a public good unrelated to ENS or Ethereum, so long as doing so does not affect the long-term viability of ENS.
Not Permissible: ENS governance must not use the funds to support projects that conflict with the goals of ENS.
IV. ENS Integrates with the global namespace
In order to facilitate making the most widely usable naming system, ENS aims to integrate with the legacy DNS naming system to the greatest extent possible without sacrificing decentralization of ENS. ENS governance will not enact changes that compromise ENS’s ability to do this.
Examples
Permissible: ENS governance should grant control of a top-level domain to its owner in the DNS system on request.
Not permissible: ENS governance must not create new top-level domains unless those domains have been granted to ENS by a DNS authority.
V. Amendments to this constitution by majority vote
Any change may be made to this constitution only by two-thirds majority and at least 1% of all tokens participating.
