This description has been heavily shortened due to character limits. Please refer to the forums for the full proposal. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188
This proposal introduces a delegate code of conduct for Arbitrum DAO alongside additional improvements to the DAO’s operational standards.
If approved, the Code of Conduct and operational updates will take effect on Monday, November 11th, followed by a ~6.5-month trial period ending on May 30th before being considered for permanent inclusion in the Arbitrum Constitution.
As the Arbitrum DAO continues to grow and evolve, a standardized code of conduct for delegates becomes increasingly necessary to create a culture that attracts high quality contributors. As the leading scaling solution across most notable metrics and one of the most active governance ecosystems, it is also important for the Arbitrum DAO to lead the industry in terms of professionalism and transparency.
Establishing clear and strict rules of conduct can be challenging and even counterproductive; therefore, the primary goal of the Delegate Code of Conduct is to help the Arbitrum DAO foster a culture of transparency, integrity, and civility. The Code of Conduct is a set of written principles that Arbitrum Delegates should embody. Delegates should use their best discretion and act in a way that aligns with the Code's spirit, rather than seeking to exploit loopholes or ambiguities.
Arbitrum Delegates should always strive to uphold the seven community values stated in the Arbitrum Constitution.
Disclosure and Transparency Policy: If a conflict of interest exists, it is expected the delegate discloses the nature and extent of the conflict in writing on the forum before voting. While it may not always be clear if an individual stands to gain “directly” or “indirectly”, it is recommended to lean on the side of over-communication in the name of transparency.
Delegates that disclose a conflict of interest are not expected to alter their voting in any way. However, as explained further below, a delegate that repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest before self-voting or if a single instance is deemed to be severe, they risk being removed from the Delegate Incentive Program or a DAO-elected position.
The Code of Conduct has been purposefully written in a manner to establish a set principles that Arbitrum Delegates should embody rather than a complete set of enforceable rules.
Conflict Resolution between Delegates
In general, it is our belief that many conflict issues can be resolved quickly and easily if approached in good faith by each party. Delegates and community members are encouraged to first address the behavior directly in private. If the matter is unable to be resolved for any reason, or if the behavior is threatening or harassing, report it to the Arbitrum Foundation using this form.
Soft-Enforcement of the Delegate Code of Conduct
While it is not feasible to hold every governance participant accountable for upholding these principles, the DAO can hold accountable delegates compensated or individuals it elects to positions of power.
Delegate Incentive Program Removal
As stated in the Delegate Incentive Program proposal, the program administrator reserves the right to issue a suspension or permanent ban if a delegate does not meet the eligibility requirements, which includes upholding the Code of Conduct.
DAO-Elected Position Removal
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative. The proposal should clearly state the reasons for removal and provide evidence supporting the claims.
As ratified in a Snapshot vote to improve predictability in the Arbitrum DAO’s operations, delegates agree to abide by the vote scheduling guidelines.
The Responsible Voting policy is an effort to strike a balance between preventing delegates from unfavorably electing themselves into a position of power and compensation while allowing them to still effectively represent their communities and tokenholders. In a normal election with multiple seats, the policy is simple: candidates may vote for themselves as long as they also cast votes to fill all the remaining positions. With token and weighted voting, there are additional nuances and guidelines must be set in place to address edge scenarios.
Shielded Elections with Weighted Voting: A few weeks ago the Entropy team posted a temperature check to gauge the DAO’s stance on shielded voting. The results indicated that a slight majority of delegates favored the use of shielded voting as the default for elections. In order to align with Security Council elections, weighted voting as opposed to approval voting will be the official default voting type.
Minimum Application Period: In order to draw a sufficient number of high quality applicants, application periods should be a minimum of 14 days.
Where n = number of seats; proposal authors should seek to have at least n+3 applicants before starting the election. Since this may not always be possible, it is simply a recommendation and not a requirement.
ARB tokens allocated to DAO initiatives are not to be used in governance. To keep circulating voting supply from increasing, whenever possible, multi-sigs holding program funds should delegate to the Arbitrum Exclude Address. This will prevent tokens from being included in quorum calculations.
Before codifying the Arbitrum Code of Conduct and updates to the DAO’s operations into the Arbitrum Constitution, we believe it is best to trial the changes for a period of 6 months post ratification of this proposal. At which point, any necessary changes or delegate feedback can be incorporated. Depending on sentiment and the changes made, the trial period can be extended another 6 months or a constitutional proposal can be put forth to update the language of the Constitution.